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On July 1, 2003, Greece suffered a dramatic loss in power.  In a matter of minutes, it went from 
one of Europe’s more influential states to just another European Union (E.U.) nation.  What 
happened?  Did it lose precious territory?  Did it squander enormous economic resources?  Did it 
dismantle key weaponry?  The answer to all of these questions is “no.”  The reason for the abrupt 
change in power is much simpler: Greece transferred its Presidency of the E.U. to Italy.  At first, 
this might seem like an inescapably losing situation.  After all, every rotating E.U. Presidency 
holder must cede its position after six months.  Indeed, Italy and Ireland suffered similar fates on 
January 1 and July 1, 2004, respectively. 
Recent events—leading Europe through a showdown over Iraq and successfully staging 
the Olympics—have provided Greece with an exceptional opportunity, nevertheless, to continue 
increasing its power and influence.  This paper presents an outline for enhancing Greece’s 
relative position in the international system, particularly within the Western alliance and the 
E.U., over the next decade.  To accomplish this, Greece must promote soft power strategies.  
Ideally, countries want to have enormous material resources at their disposal.  Few countries, 
however, are ever in such a position.  For the less endowed states, the only two options are to 
cultivate non-material power bases or to accept a low placement in world politics.  Realizing 
Greece’s limitations, this paper offers an outline for the former: developing Greece’s soft power.   
This paper begins with an overview of the changing nature of power in world politics.  
This is followed by an assessment of the distribution of power in the current international 
system.  The options available to states in terms of strategic alignments and frameworks in the 
present system are then weighed.  Armed with this background, the paper goes on to assess how 
Greece, specifically, can take advantage of its recent status and unique experiences to increase its 
relative power in such a way that could help safeguard its long-term national interests. 
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The Soft Side of Power 
Scholarly discussions of international relations highlight the centrality of power.  Indeed, one of 
the concepts that every prominent school of thought in the field highlights is power.1  Few 
serious students of politics would quibble with the thesis that power is vital to the protection and 
promotion of national interests.   
Traditionally, power has been viewed as emanating largely from material capabilities.2  
During the Cold War era, this was frequently expressed using Mao Tse-Tung’s famous dictum, 
“Power comes out of the barrel of a gun.”  While this might be a bit too simple to capture the 
complexities of world politics, when it comes to safeguarding countries’ most vital interests—
state survival and self-defense—world leaders have discovered that relative advantages in 
military armaments and economic fortunes are important elements of national power.3   
                                                 
1From Realism, see, e.g., Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for 
Power and Peace, fifth edition (New York, Knopf, 1973); Kenneth Waltz, Theory of 
International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979); and Robert Gilpin, War & Change in 
World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).  From Liberalism, see, e.g., 
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in 
Transition, third edition (New York: Longman, 2001); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The 
Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic, 1990); and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The 
Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002).  From Structuralism (a.k.a. Marxism), see, e.g., Immanuel 
Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2004); and Christopher K. Chase-Dunn and Thomas D. Hall, Rise and Demise: Comparing 
World-Systems (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997).  From Constructivism, see, e.g., Peter J. 
Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1996); and Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International 
Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
2Waltz, Theory of International Politics; and William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a 
Unipolar World,” International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 5-41. 
3For a historical perspective that highlights the importance of material elements to world 
leaders’ calculations, see Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Change and 
Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987). 
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Still, in recent decades, most students of international relations have come to understand 
that there is far more to power than mere material resources.  In fact, a whole new school of 
thought has emerged in the past fifteen years, premised on the point that ideational components 
of power are just as important, if not more important, than material capabilities.4  This paper is 
grounded in this growing perspective that power is best understood as involving material and 
ideational elements: hard and soft power.5 
The E.U. Presidency offers proof that power not only emanates from material resources 
and capabilities; what some scholars call “hard power.”  The power that the E.U. Presidency 
confers is one of authority and identity; “soft power.”  Joseph Nye has been instrumental in 
flushing out differences between the two types of power: 
 
Hard power is the ability to get others to do what they otherwise would not do 
through threats or rewards.  Whether by economic carrots or military sticks, the 
ability to coax or coerce has long been the central element of power. . . . 
Soft power, on the other hand, is the ability to get desired outcomes 
because others want what you want.  It is the ability to achieve goals through 
attraction rather than coercion.  It works by convincing others to follow or getting 
them to agree to norms and institutions that produce the desired behavior.6   
 
Power through attraction, as opposed to power through coercion, has different bases.  The 
ability to coerce effectively relies greatly on the material capabilities to punish or reward plus the 
will to carry through declared actions.  The ability to attract other governments to accept one’s 
                                                 
4See, e.g., Wendt, Social Theory. 
5Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: 
PublicAffairs, 2004).  The conceptualization of soft power is fairly recent development, 
undertaken largely by Joseph Nye.  As such, this section draws heavily on Nye’s work. 
6Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Power and Interdependence in the 
Information Age,” Foreign Affairs, 77, no. 5 (September-October 1998), 86. 
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platform or agenda, however, rests on the appeal of one’s values, flavored with legitimacy.7  
“Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others.”8  As such, whereas the 
currency of hard power is largely tangible, the currency of soft power is largely ideational in that 
it involves “an attraction to shared values and the justness and duty of contributing to the 
achievement of those values.”9  Joseph Nye conceptualizes these differences as resting along a 
spectrum ranging from command power to co-optive power (see Table 1).10 
 
Table 1.  The Spectrum of Power 
  
  Hard Power                                          Soft Power 
 
Spectrum of Behaviors                           Coercion           Inducement          Agenda Setting        Attraction   
Command < -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Co-Opt 
 
Most Likely Resources                           Force                Payments              Institutions               Values 
                          Sanctions          Bribes                                                    Culture 
                                                                                                                  Policies 
 
[Reproduced from Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), 8]. 
 
Soft power is fundamental to the conduct of international relations for four reasons.  First, 
hard power alone often fails to produce commensurate outcomes.  As Nye observes, “When 
                                                 
7Legitimacy is an important element of soft power in international politics.  As Nye 
observes, “If you believe that my objectives are legitimate, I may be able to persuade you to do 
something for me without using threats or inducements.  It is possible to get many desired 
outcomes without having much tangible power over others.”  Ibid., 2. 
8Ibid., 5. 
9Ibid., 7. 
10As Nye writes, “Command power—the ability to change what others do—can rest on 
coercion or inducement.  Co-optive power—the ability to shape what others want—can rest on 
the attractiveness of one’s culture and the values or ability to manipulate the agenda of political 
choices in a manner that makes others fail to express some preferences because they seem to be 
too unrealistic.”  Ibid. 
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people define power as synonymous with the resources that produce it, they sometimes 
encounter the paradox that those best endowed with power do not always get the outcomes they 
want.”11  For instance, the relative material capabilities of the Soviet Union were far superior to 
those of Afghanistan in the 1970s and 1980s.  Still, the Soviet Union was not able to defeat 
mujahadeen guerrilla forces in the decade-long Afghan conflict.  To understand this 
shortcoming, one has to recognize that more than just hard power was at play during the 
Afghanistan War.   
Second, actors with little hard power still carry enormous influence in international 
affairs.  For example, in the Middle East, Jordan remains one of the most influential states 
despite having relatively fewer military, economic, and energy capabilities than many of its 
neighbors, especially Israel and Saudi Arabia.  Perhaps a more prominent example of a small 
state with tremendous clout is the Holy See.  The Pope has no army.  He has no weapons of mass 
destruction.  He has no oil.  He has few citizens.  And all of his state’s territory is isolated, 
surrounded by the city of Rome.  Yet, the Vatican is an influential state in international affairs.  
In fact, the case of the Pope is instructive.  The Pope is a sovereign.  But his power seems to 
emanate more from his moral authority than his sovereignty.  The implication is that even private 
individuals can wield influence in world politics if they develop their soft power.  Just look at 
Bono, George Soros, Nelson Mandela (before becoming an elected official), Bishop Desmond 
Tutu, and the late Mother Teresa.  These people teach us that soft power need not necessarily be 
based on hard power nor need it emanate directly from government.  As Nye reminds us, “Soft 
power does not belong to the government in the same degree that hard power does.”12 
                                                 
11Ibid., 3. 
12Ibid., 14. 
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Third, the employment of soft power is, generally, less costly than the utilization of hard 
power, which means that soft power generates better pay-offs.  As Nye points out, “Hard power 
can rest on inducements (‘carrots’) or threats (‘sticks’).”13  In either case, producing desired 
outcomes comes at a particular cost.  Often the cost is acceptable, such as when the United 
States, in 1994, forced a military junta in Haiti to abdicate its rule and go into exile.  In this case, 
the stick was an invasion followed by either capture or death, and the carrot was that the junta 
would not get the stick.  Despite the junta eventually fleeing Haiti, the United States could not 
avoid incurring costs.  American forces still had to land in Haiti as part of a peace operation.  
The bigger problem, though, is when the costs of wielding hard power become intolerable, such 
as in the Vietnam War.  Soft power offers a means that can, in some instances, avoid the costs 
associated with hard power.  As Nye writes, “If I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do 
not have to use carrots or sticks to make you do it.”14  If sticks (along with stones) break bones 
and carrots break banks, soft power increases the odds of keeping bones and banks intact. 
Fourth (and arguably most important of all), soft power is vital to global affairs because 
the information revolution and globalization have transformed the nature of international 
relations, creating issue-areas best addressed with soft power.  In fact, Nye suggests that, in the 
21st century, world politics is best conceptualized as a three-dimensional playing field: 
 
The agenda of world politics has become like a three-dimensional chess game in which 
one can win only by playing vertically as well as horizontally.  On the top board of 
classic interstate military issues, the United States is indeed the only superpower with 
global military reach, and it makes sense to speak in traditional terms of unipolarity or 
hegemony.  However, on the middle board of interstate economic issues, the distribution 
                                                 
13Ibid., 5. 
14Ibid., 6.  Nye notes that this is the cost effective route: “When you can get others to 
admire your ideals and to want what you want, you do not have to spend as much on sticks and 
carrots to move them in your direction.”  Ibid., x. 
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of power is multipolar.  The United States cannot obtain the outcomes it wants on trade, 
antitrust, or financial regulation issues without the agreement of the European Union, 
Japan, China, and others.  It makes little sense to call this American hegemony.  And on 
the bottom board of transnational issues like terrorism, international crime, climate 
change, and the spread of infectious diseases, power is widely distributed and chaotically 
organized among state and nonstate actors. . . .   
If you are in a three-dimensional game, you will lose if you focus only on one 
board and fail to notice the other boards and the vertical connections among them.15 
 
Regardless of whether or not you are persuaded by the 3-D game analogy, states must work with 
state and non-state actors on nearly every imaginable issue-area, including the traditionally “high 
politics” issue-area of security.  In such a context, soft power becomes critical. 
Indeed, Nye hints that each level of issue-areas privileges a distinct type of power 
respectively: military, economic, and soft (see Table 2).16  While each type of power is useful 
and utilized on each “board” of the game, the importance of each type of power varies by level.  
Because attraction and agenda setting are extremely important in addressing transnational issues 
that frequently involve non-state actors and global public opinion, and because such issues are 
growing in prominence, soft power also proportionally increases in significance: 
 
Hard power is relevant to getting the outcomes we want on all three chessboards, but 
many of the transnational issues . . . cannot be resolved by military force alone.  
Representing the dark side of globalization, these issues are inherently multilateral and 
require cooperation for their solution.  Soft power is particularly important in dealing 
with the issues that arise from the bottom chessboard, transnational relations.17 
 
 
                                                 
15Ibid., 4-5, 137. 
16Ibid., 30-32. 
17Ibid., 137. 
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Table 2.  The Three Types of Power 
  
Behaviors 
 
Primary Currencies 
 
Government Policies 
 
 
Military Power 
 
Coercion 
Deterrence 
Protection 
 
Threats 
Force 
 
Coercive Diplomacy 
War 
Alliance 
 
 
Economic Power 
 
Inducement 
Coercion 
 
Payments 
Sanctions 
 
Aid 
Bribes 
Sanctions 
 
 
Soft Power 
 
Attraction 
Agenda Setting 
 
Values 
Culture 
Policies 
Institutions 
 
 
Public Diplomacy 
Bilateral Diplomacy 
Multilateral Diplomacy 
 
[Reproduced from Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), 31]. 
 
While soft power can be thought of as simply non-material, a more accurate 
conceptualization requires an understanding of its depth and complexity.  There are, in essence, 
three types of soft power: normative, practical, and authoritative (see Table 3).  Normative soft 
power is perhaps the most commonly recognized form of soft power.  Normative soft power rests 
on the attractiveness of one’s values.  It can emanate from something as simple as the appeal of a 
country’s commercial culture (e.g., McDonald’s, Levi’s, and Coca Cola).  But there is far more 
to normative soft power than just commercialism.18  For instance, during the Cold War, some of 
the cultural elements of the United States that appealed to Soviets included freedom of speech, 
religious tolerance, open press, civil liberties, and open and competitive elections.  The norms a 
country promotes can leave an enormous impression on others.  While the values might be 
complex, the dynamic by which they convert into soft power is actually simple.  Leaders or 
citizens of one country are swayed by the appeal of another country just as fans are swayed by 
                                                 
18Ibid., 11-13. 
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idols.  If what a country stands for is appealing, then others will frequently give in to such 
values, ideals, and norms.  It is merely a matter of promoting norms and ideologies that are 
alluring and seductive. 
 
Table 3.  The Categories of Soft Power 
  
Normative 
 
 
Practical 
 
Authoritative 
 
Basis 
 
Values 
 
Practices 
 
Roles 
 
 
Elements 
 
Cultural, Social, Economic, 
Legal, and Political Ideals 
 
Historical Endeavors and  
Current Policies 
 
 
Governing Institutions and  
Legitimate Organizations 
 
Exercise 
 
Ideology and Norm Promotion 
 
Domestic and Foreign Policy 
 
 
Agenda Setting 
 
 
Practical soft power is similar, albeit slightly different, than normative soft power.  
Practical soft power is rooted in the historical practices and current policies of a particular state.  
It is one thing to advocate human rights in speeches.  It is quite another to promote human rights 
in practice.  Again, returning to an example involving the United States, America has long been 
on record as wanting the world to be a better and more humane place.  But desires alone do not 
make the world better.  Action is needed.  When a country like the United States actually assists 
in the delivery of humanitarian relief in Somalia or when it intervenes militarily to prevent ethnic 
cleansing in Kosovo, it increases its power and prestige internationally.  People often judge states 
based on their foreign policies.  By undertaking actions that appeal to others, thus earning a 
degree of admiration, countries inescapably increase their soft power—allowing them to exert 
even greater influence in the near future. 
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The third type of soft power is less related to the first two.  Authoritative soft power, 
unlike either normative or practical soft power that results from the values and policies a state 
promotes in word and deed, is more of a conferred form of influence.  Whereas the first two 
types of soft power are more active, authoritative soft power is more passive.  Authoritative soft 
power emanates from holding a certain position that confers power and influence.  In other 
words, it is a by-product of being authorized to undertake certain roles and functions.  Quite 
frequently, such positions are institutionalized.  For instance, the E.U. Presidency, while 
temporary, is nonetheless a conferred source of power—conferred by an agreement among 25 
nations, and exercised through a legitimate international institution.  The rotating Presidency of 
the United Nations Security Council is a similar form of soft power.  But authoritative soft power 
is not necessarily temporary.  Russia, China, France, the United States, and the United Kingdom 
all have a unique form of authoritative soft power that is permanent: they each have veto power 
on the U.N. Security Council.  This institutional power allows them to set and drive the agenda 
regarding international security matters—and to do so with legitimacy.19   
While both types of power, hard and soft, are hardly new, soft power has taken on a 
different stature that mirrors the increasing prominence of institutions and information—and 
world leaders are accepting its increasing significance.  “This political game in a global 
information age suggests that relative importance of soft power will increase.”20  In this new era 
where soft power is becoming hard power’s significant other, new opportunities are arising for 
                                                 
19As Nye argues, “Institutions can enhance a country’s soft power. . . .  When countries 
make their power legitimate in the eyes of others, they encounter less resistance to their     
wishes. . . .  If a country can shape international rules that are consistent with its interests and 
values, its actions will more likely appear legitimate in the eyes of others.  If it uses institutions 
and follows rules that encourage other countries to channel or limit their activities in ways it 
prefers, it will not need as many costly carrots or sticks.”  Ibid., 10-11. 
20Ibid., 31. 
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states that have traditionally been unable to influence international politics for lack of enough 
material capabilities.  In such a context, states can develop (and exploit) soft power niches.  The 
E.U. Presidency is an example of a rotating—thus temporary—soft power niche.  The holder of 
the Presidency is conferred with a unique authority to further its particular agenda with the 
assistance of 24 of the world’s most advanced and materially well endowed states—and to do so 
with institutional legitimacy.  Thus, countries as tiny as Luxembourg and Malta, when they hold 
the E.U. Presidency, become some of the most influential states in the international system, even 
if for only six months. 
If a country can increase its soft power by holding the E.U. Presidency, then shouldn’t it 
be possible to establish other niche positions which permit the exercise of soft power to influence 
global events?  In fact, don’t such niches already exist?  If so, a country that is seen as providing 
a unique and vital function within a political system should be able to increase its relative 
standing in world politics—and to attract other states towards its policy positions. 
History, to be sure, is replete with examples of niches.  The most obvious is the hegemon.  
Hegemony is a niche that is highly valued, yet only a few states are ever in a position to serve 
this function.  In fact, hegemony is arguably the most important niche in international relations 
because it helps promote international order and secure collective goods.  While states can 
compete for this coveted title, moreover, only one ever reigns supreme as the international 
system’s hegemon.  In today’s world, the hegemon is the United States.  Another example of a 
prominent international relations niche is the off-shore power balancer, a niche filled by Great 
Britain in the 19th Century.  Of course, both of these niches are solo performances that are largely 
dependent on great power material resources. 
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But not all niches are strictly limited to one state at a time.  Some niches can have more 
than one state “specialist.”  Nor do all niches have a prerequisite of a mammoth material 
resource endowment, as “soft power does not depend on hard power.”21  Peace-keeping is an 
excellent example.  In the post-World War II world, this niche has been held by such nations as 
Canada, Togo, Pakistan, Austria, and Australia.  Humanitarian needs have often been well 
addressed by Switzerland and Austria.  And, in the field of human rights promotion and 
protection, the Holy See, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Spain have recently begun carving out 
niches. 
Returning to the case of Greece, it is true that overnight, on July 1, 2003, it suffered a 
relative power loss.  However, with some cultivation, Greece can seize on the turmoil in the 
current Iraq War era and build on its post-Olympiad prominence to create an identity that, over 
the long-term, confers a unique status and role within the Western bloc, thus increasing its soft 
power and international influence. 
 
The Current Distribution of Power 
Power is never distributed evenly in political systems.  The international system is no exception.  
Structural Realists have been at the forefront of studying the implications of different 
international power structures.  According to Kenneth Waltz, the international political system is 
always anarchic (i.e., absent world government) and always composed of functionally-similar 
units (i.e., sovereign states).  So how do international political systems change?  Only in terms of 
the distribution of capabilities.22   
                                                 
21Ibid., 9. 
22Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 100-101. 
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Regardless of whether or not one subscribes to Structural Realism, it is hard not to 
conclude, as Waltz does, that the distribution of power is a useful concept for characterizing 
international politics during any given era.  The consensus is that three general types of power 
distributions can exist: unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity.23  In today’s world, the structure 
of the system is generally considered to be unipolar.24  Unipolarity is a distribution of power 
whereby one preponderant state or security bloc is militarily unchallenged and endowed with 
tremendous hard and soft capabilities to sustain its pre-eminence.  No other counter-weight 
exists.25  
As this definition states, for a pole to exist in the 21st century, it must have tremendous 
hard and soft power at its disposal.  Prior to World War II, most poles were measured strictly in 
terms of hard power material resources.  During the Cold War, when the international system 
transformed from multipolar to bipolar, and the two superpower poles vied for “hearts and 
                                                 
23Polarity is a concept that represents the concentration of power within a system.  
Unipolarity means power is concentrated in one pole (i.e., political entity).  Bipolarity means 
power is concentrated in two poles.  Multipolarity means power is concentrated in three or more 
poles.  Randall Schweller argues that tripolarity (a system with three poles) needs to be treated 
differently from what he calls multipolarity (a system of four or more poles).  See, Randall L. 
Schweller, Deadly Imbalance: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1998).  While I find Schweller’s argument persuasive, it is not 
necessary to address it for purposes of this article. 
24Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1 
(Winter 1990/1991), 23-33; Wohlforth, “Stability of a Unipolar World,” 5-41; Ethan B. Kapstein 
and Michael Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold 
War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after 
the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), 5-41; Stephen G. Brooks 
and William C. Wohlforth, “American Primacy in Perspective,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 4 
(July/August 2002), 20-33; Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment Revisited,” National 
Interest, No. 70 (Winter 2002/2003), 5-17; and Louis Klarevas, “Is the U.S. Still Number One? 
Unipolarity after the Iraq War,” European Institute Working Paper, London School of 
Economics (forthcoming). 
25Klarevas, “Is the U.S. Still Number One?” 
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minds” in addition to military and economic superiority, soft power began to grow in 
prominence.  But even during this nuclear age, hard power remained the gauge by which polarity 
and system structure were assessed.  In other words, the history of international relations is one 
in which, to return to Nye’s three-dimensional chessboard analogy, the top level of military-
security affairs has always been privileged.  As such, hard power—and in particular military 
power—has historically been considered the most valuable form of power.   
With the end of the Cold War, the world was left with one superpower.  As the threat of a 
bipolar nuclear showdown disappeared almost overnight, a host of non-traditional issues 
managed to muscle their way to the top of the international agenda.  With the new challenges 
came new approaches and understandings, one of which was the belief that soft power was just 
as important, if not more important, for addressing these “transnational issues.”  Therefore, in the 
post-Cold War era, calculations of the distribution of power in the international system are 
expanding to include soft power alongside hard power. 
So where is this concentration of hard and soft power located in today’s post-Cold War 
world?  In a U.S.-led Western bloc.26  After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States 
emerged as the only remaining superpower in the world.  The end of the Cold War, the demise of 
the East Bloc, and the exercise of American power in the Persian Gulf War of 1991, left 
observers with little doubt that the early post-Cold War era would be a period of American 
primacy.27  In the words of Charles Krauthammer, the 1990s marked the start of the “unipolar 
moment,” a world where the “center of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United 
                                                 
26Krauhammer, “The Unipolar Moment”; and Klarevas, “Is the U.S. Still Number One?” 
27See, e.g., Robert Jervis, “International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?” 
International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), 52-67; and Samuel P. Huntington, “Why 
International Primacy Matters,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), 68-83. 
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States, attended by its Western allies.”28  Krauthammer seemed to accept the preponderance 
argument of Realists when he observed, “There is but one first-rate power and no prospect in the 
immediate future of any power to rival it.”29  But he went further, suggesting that blocs can be 
important to assessing poles.  Currently, the only pole in the system is “a single pole of world 
power that consists of the United States at the apex of the industrial West.”30 
On September 11, 2001, the United States suffered through the deadliest attack against its 
homeland since World War II.  Despite the occasional—premature and misguided—commentary 
that the era of American primacy had passed, immediate worldwide reaction reflected the 
centrality and pre-eminence of the United States.31  A vast majority of countries expressed 
support for American efforts to organize a global war against terrorism.  Of particular 
noteworthiness, every single major power, including Russia and China, offered some form of 
support to the United States.  As if this show of unity was not enough, the United States led a 
coalition of forces into Afghanistan, toppling the Taliban regime with unprecedented speed and 
precision.   
When the United States turned its sights onto Iraq, though, allies in the war on terror 
parted ways.  Divisions arose as to whether or not toppling the regime of Iraqi dictator Saddam 
Hussein was necessary—or even wise.  For the first time since the end of the Cold War, cracks 
                                                 
28Krauthammer, “Unipolar Moment,” 24; emphasis added. 
29Ibid.  Krauthammer goes so far as to provide a standard for how to judge preponderance 
in practice: “American preeminence is based on the fact that it is the only country with the 
military, diplomatic, political and economic assets to be a decisive player in any conflict in 
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30Ibid.; emphasis added. 
31See, e.g., Steve Smith, “The End of the Unipolar Moment: September 11 and the Future 
of World Order,” Social Science Research Council After September 11 Essays, available at: 
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were visible in the Western bloc.  With France and Germany leading the charge against 
American strategy, some commentators began declaring that unipolarity was over.  For instance, 
John Gray proclaimed, “a multipolar world is already a reality.”32  Andrew Moravcsik, too, has 
argued that the world is no longer unipolar.  “The good news after Iraq is that we live in a bipolar 
world after all,” he declares—with two superpowers: the U.S. and the E.U.33  Immanuel 
Wallerstein has gone as far as to declare, “the eagle has crash landed.”34 
But strategic decision-makers in world capitals should be wary of such one-sided 
arguments.  Instead, they have an obligation to be mindful of five important trends in world 
politics.  First, the U.S. is continuing to grow in relative hard power vis-à-vis other major 
powers.  When compared to other potential major power challengers France, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, Russia, Japan, and China, the U.S. dominates them in nearly every key 
indicator of hard power: gross domestic product; military expenditures; strategic weaponry 
(including nuclear weaponry and aircraft carrier task forces); military satellites and intelligence 
capabilities; international assistance; energy production; market capitalization; royalty income; 
hi-tech exports; internet users, servers, and hosts; and research and development expenditures.35  
                                                 
32John Gray, “For Europe’s Sake, Keep Britain Out,” New Statesman, May 19, 2003, 21.  
Gray believes that even in military affairs, the failure of the U.S. to secure cooperation from 
traditional ally Turkey during the Iraq War signals a significant decline in American power.  
Ibid. 
33Andrew Moravcsik, “The World Is Bipolar After All,” Newsweek, May 5, 2003, 37.  
Moravcsik makes his assertion based on three factual claims: the E.U. is the largest trading entity 
in the world economy; the E.U. states account for over half of the civilian assistance disbursed 
internationally; and the E.U. states provide more peace-keepers than the U.S.  Ibid. 
34Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Eagle Has Crash Landed,” Foreign Policy, No. 131 
(July/August 2002), 60.  Wallerstein believes that “Pax Americana is over” because the United 
States is “a lone superpower that lacks true power, a world leader nobody follows and few 
respect, and a nation drifting dangerously amidst a global chaos it cannot control.”  Ibid., 60, 63. 
35Klarevas, “Is the U.S. Still Number One?” 
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Even when the E.U. is treated as a uniform political entity, the indicators tell the same story.  
Moreover, the U.S., despite a few rough years economically, has either maintained or increased 
its dominance in most of these areas since the mid-1990s.36  Even the fall of the dollar, which 
some cite as evidence of American decline, can be seen as reflecting the power and flexibility, in 
circumstances of low growth and inflation, to control one’s short-term economic destiny.37   
Second, the U.S. is, however, squandering its soft power, in large part as a result of its 
troubled and unpopular invasion of Iraq.  The proposed end-game behind toppling the regime of 
Saddam Hussein was supposed to be the development of a Western-friendly democracy.  While 
the U.S. might have sought to win the hearts and minds of the Arab world, many in the Arab 
world have interpreted the invasion as a stab in the heart and an abuse of the mind.  Indeed, the 
Iraq War has managed to turn many in the Middle East who once held favorable attitudes of the 
U.S. against America and its coalition partners, serving as a counter-productive rallying call to 
Islamic extremists to unite in an effort to bring violence directly to Americans.   But the negative 
outcomes of the Iraq War reach far beyond the Middle East.  All over the world, citizens and 
leaders have expressed disdain over the policies of the U.S.  As Joseph Nye observes, “Despite 
its impressive resources, the attractiveness of the United States declined quite sharply in 2003.  
In the run-up to the Iraq War, polls showed that the United States lost an average of 30 points of 
support in most European countries.”38  These trends have led one commentator to conclude that 
“the lesson of Iraq is that the U.S.’s soft power is in decline.”39 
                                                 
36Ibid. 
37Ibid.  The declining dollar vis-à-vis the Euro, if nothing else, has helped the U.S. reduce 
its trade deficit. 
38Nye, Soft Power, 35. 
39Paul Kelly, “Power Pact,” Australian, July 26, 2003, 1. 
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Third, the E.U., on the contrary, is increasing its soft power.  “The idea that war is now 
unthinkable among countries that fought bitterly for centuries, and that Europe has become an 
island of peace and prosperity creates a positive image in much of the world.”40  Indeed, there 
are many aspects of a uniting Europe that others find seductive.  The E.U. promotes attractive 
economic market forces (the “four freedoms,” cutting-edge telecommunications, integrated 
transportation networks, and a powerful common currency), domestic policies (environmental 
protection, socio-economic welfare, human rights, and the rule of law), foreign policies (peace-
keeping, development assistance, nation building, and multilateral preferences), and cultural 
projects (tourism, film, music, and literature).41  Parag Khanna believes that these qualities 
“combine the coercive strengths of Mars and the seductive wiles of Venus,” blending substance 
with style.42  As a result, Europe is transforming the nature of world politics: 
 
[B]y cleverly deploying both its hard power and its sensitive side, the European Union 
has become more effective—and more attractive—than the United States on the catwalk 
of diplomatic clout.  Meet the real New Europe: the world’s first metrosexual 
superpower. . . . 
Stripping off stale national sovereignty (that’s so last century), Europeans now 
parade their “pooled power,” the new look for the geopolitical season. . . . 
Expect Bend It Like Brussels to play soon in capital cities worldwide.43 
 
As Khanna suggests, in the present Iraq War era, the E.U. arguably wields more soft power than 
any other political entity—and its soft power continues to grow.   
                                                 
40Nye, Soft Power, 77. 
41As Nye argues, “A measure of the E.U.’s emerging soft power is the view that it is a 
positive force for solving global problems.”  Ibid., 78. 
42Parag Khanna, “The Metrosexual Superpower,” Foreign Policy, No. 143 (July/August 
2004), 66. 
43Ibid., 66-68; emphasis in original. 
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Fourth, the E.U., though, is hardly united on foreign policy, and certainly not set on a 
uniform course of challenging the U.S.  The supposed “counterweight” to American hegemony, 
the European Union, remains split over how to address major international policy matters.  This 
became evident during the Iraq crisis.  During the build-up to the war, Europe had a chance to 
check American assertiveness.  It failed because it was divided over whether or not its future 
involves a strategic alliance with the U.S.  Many in Europe believe the Iraq War shows how 
different Europe is from America.  Obviously, perspectives differ depending on which coast of 
the “great pond” one is located.  But the dispute over Iraq also reveals how much disunity exists 
among Europeans.  Arguably, the division of greater magnitude is not trans-Atlantic.  It is intra-
European.  Here are just a few important issues that produced disagreement beyond the “Old” 
and “New” Europe divide that resulted in the now famous “gang of eight” letter and the French 
scolding it prompted: Eurocorps and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP); farm 
subsidies (which is a major point of contention along the Franco-German axis); immigration 
policy; and investment fund management and regulation.44  In the coming years, two matters are 
likely to place the future of European unity on a major fault line—with either tectonic plate 
capable of causing a collapse of European structures.  All eyes will certainly be focused on 
deliberations in non-Euro Zone countries over whether or not to convert to the Euro.  Recently, 
the Euro has made a strong showing—dominating the dollar in foreign exchange.  Still, there are 
signs that in some smaller E.U. states conversion has come at a price.  And in Berlin, there are 
some who question how long Germany can keep playing the “bank” role.  Should the United 
Kingdom continue foregoing the Euro, it might not only encourage Sweden and Denmark to also 
keep passing on the Euro Zone, but it might discourage efforts to continue stringent reforms in 
                                                 
44Louis Klarevas, “Not a Divorce,” Survival, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Winter 2003), 232. 
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the economies of the 10 new E.U. members (most of which are former East bloc states).45  The 
other key test will be how E.U. countries receive the proposal for a new E.U. constitution.  
Should Europe adopt a strong Convention on the Future of Europe, it will place the continent on 
the road to superpower status.  But the odds are against the ratification of a new constitution that 
creates a United States of Europe, as sovereignty still has guardians in Europe.46   
Fifth, the Western bloc remains the “sole pole” in the current unipolar system—although 
there is no guarantee that unipolarity will last beyond the next decade.47  Those like French 
President Jacques Chirac, who believe that Europe is a global power in a “multipolar” world, 
perhaps need a reality check.  If nothing else, as we just saw, Chirac’s references to a European 
“counterweight” raise an interesting question: which Europe exactly?  N.A.T.O.?  The E.U.?  
Old Europe?  New Europe?  The more accurate description is that the U.S. has traditionally 
partnered with its formal transatlantic allies (including Canada) to promote common interests.  
And these allies will continue to partner to promote common interests in the near future.  But 
what is important to note is that the interests they share have changed.  Of course, this change 
has led Robert Kagan, who sees Euro-American differences as running much deeper than 
differences between Bush and Chirac, to assert that “Americans are from Mars and Europeans 
from Venus.”48  The problem with Kagan’s perspective, though, is that trans-Atlantic interests 
                                                 
45The worst case scenario, though, is that opinions within Euro Zone states begin to shift, 
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47Ibid. 
48Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order 
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remain—and grow.  The trans-Atlantic agenda indeed has broadened to include economic, 
social, and humanitarian interests alongside security interests.  President Bush, for instance, went 
to Evian, France for a meeting with G8 leaders (six of whom are formal U.S. allies) at the height 
of the feud over the Iraq War.  Why?  Because they need each other’s help to promote a common 
agenda.  The U.S. may be the world’s most influential country, but that does not mean it wants 
to, or can, do everything on its own.  It seems that the trans-Atlantic partners still prefer each 
others help—perhaps not on everything, but on most things.  Whether fighting AIDS and 
improving living conditions in the Third World, or countering nuclear proliferation and 
combating terrorism, Americans and Europeans continue to believe that their interests will be 
better served if they act in consortium.  Those who primarily see ebbs in transatlantic ties seem 
to discount this.  These common interests and the ties they promote suggest that, while people 
writing obituaries for the West might one day be lauded for their forecasts, right now they are 
perhaps better characterized as a bit premature.49  After all, some American soldiers might have 
refused to call fried potatoes “French Fries” following the fall-out over Iraq, but they still drank 
Evian spring water while eating their potatoes because Evian remains the official bottled water of 
the U.S. Army.50  For this reason, it remains safe to continue speaking of a Western pole. 
This is the current context in which all Western countries find themselves.  The post-Iraq 
War era is one of a dominant and assertive America—joined by some European allies, shunned 
by others—in a global campaign to project its power and protect its primacy.  The setting is 
                                                 
49For an article that raises the question of the end of the Western bloc, see Ivo H. Daalder, 
“The End of Atlanticism,” Survival, 45, no. 2 (Summer 2003), 147-166.  For a different 
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marked by divisions in the Western bloc: a trans-Atlantic rift between the United States and a 
non-uniform Europe.  Fissures in the American-led pole obviously present difficult challenges to 
overcome for the Western allies, some of whom may not wish to overcome them.  But at the 
same time, they also present numerous opportunities for less partisan Western governments (e.g., 
the current New Democracy government in Greece) to exercise power and improve their relative 
standing within the bloc and globally. 
 
Developing Soft Power Strategic Options 
Whether its Bush’s reference to “coalitions of the willing” or Chirac’s reference to “multipolar 
counter-weights,” Realism continues to dominate discourse and strategy in the Western world.51  
Realism informs us that states usually pursue one of three general strategies for improving their 
relative standing in international relations.  The three strategies are Realism’s Three Bs: 
balancing, bandwagoning, and buckpassing.  As Robert Powell writes, “When one state threatens 
another, a third state has at least three options.  It can align with the threatened state, align with 
the state making the threat, or try to avoid taking part in the conflict by waiting.”52  Powell’s 
statement implies that a threat must be present.  But, as states anticipate the behavior of other 
states, Powell’s statement extends to include reactions to potential threats as well as 
opportunities for exploitation.53  Obviously, strategy then becomes dependent on a state’s 
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subjective interpretation of “threat”—actual and potential.  However, as the developer of 
balance-of-threat theory notes, one of the more concrete factors that affects such an assessment is 
aggregate hard power.54  As a result, these three options represent responses to threats or 
potential threats arrived at based, in part, on assessments of the distribution of hard power.55  In 
today’s world, the distribution of power is one where the U.S. is behind the steering wheel of a 
unipolar vehicle, but with many Western back-seat drivers screaming conflicting directions, as 
shown in the previous section. 
For the United States and some of its Western allies, like the United Kingdom and Italy, 
the greatest threats are rogue states and the networks they promote.  For other Western states, 
though, the graver threat is an assertive America unbound by checks and balances.  For states in 
the E.U., this situation presents at least three choices according to Realists: they can attempt to 
break-away from their traditional ties to the U.S. and attempt to provide a hard power 
counterweight against American assertiveness with their fellow European allies (balancing); they 
can support U.S.-led strategies against global threats, anticipating greater hard payoffs from 
siding with the most powerful country in the world (bandwagoning); or they can eschew the 
dilemma by sitting on the sidelines, neither opposing nor supporting the United States 
(buckpassing). 
The Three Bs emanate from what is the dominant paradigm of International Relations: 
Realism.  Tracing its origins back to Thucydides’ masterwork, The History of the Peloponnesian 
Wars, Realism posits: (1) the primary agents in international politics are states, especially major 
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powers; (2) states selfishly pursue their national interests, the most vital being national security; 
(3) the most important resources in the pursuit of national interests are material capabilities, 
especially offensive military capabilities; and (4) international politics is distinct from domestic 
politics because the former is anarchic.  In such a setting, non-state actors are discounted, 
unilateralism trumps multilateralism, military force is a privileged means to an end, and 
international law and human rights are expendable because morality is never universal.  In this 
grim view, world politics is a state of war among states.56 
In recent years, other schools of thought have begun challenging the strict teachings of 
Realism.  For scholars subscribing to these schools, Realism is a worldview ill-equipped to deal 
with the security challenges of the 21st Century.  Instead, they have proposed that: (1) 
international politics involves a variety of agents, including states (big and small), organizations 
(inter-governmental and non-governmental), groups (transnational and domestic), and even 
individuals (public and private); (2) agents pursue interests—selfish and collective—through an 
international agenda that includes economic, environmental, developmental, and cultural matters, 
in addition to security matters; (3) the exercise of power involves a variety of hard (material) and 
soft (ideational) resources; and (4) laws and institutions (both domestic and international as the 
line is blurred)—based on principles, norms, morals, and rules—play the vital function of 
providing order in the international system.  In this world, a rock star like Bono can have just as 
much impact as a politician like Russian President Vladimir Putin.  As a result, poverty in Africa 
might receive as much attention as arms control in central Europe.  Hope tends to trump despair 
in this paradigm which holds some moral standards as universal.  The international community 
can improve the world and promote justice through cooperation— especially in international 
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institutions, as multilateralism is a preferred approach to global problems.  If, as Thomas Hobbes 
once suggested, force and fraud are the two principal virtues of Realism, law and legitimacy can 
be seen as principal counter-virtues.57 
Certainly, these competing schools raise important questions that urge scrutiny of our 
openness to Realist teachings.  One inevitable consequence is to accept Realism’s 
conceptualization of the international political system with a large degree of skepticism.  For 
Structural Realists, at least, the international system is conceptualized as: (1) anarchic as a result 
of all states being sovereign; (2) the game of like-units (functionally indistinguishable—
converging states); and (3) altered only according to the distribution of material capabilities (i.e., 
hard power, especially military power).58  In other words, since the system is always anarchic 
and states are always like-units, the focus of our attention should center on the distribution of 
hard power because it is the only thing that changes.   
What if the Realists, though, are wrong?  What if the world is more complex than this 
simple model?  What if sovereignty is transferred a bit via institutions?  What if states are 
differentiated by function?  What if power includes more than hard material resources? 
Just suppose that a smaller country is able to utilize institutions to exercise what Joseph 
Grieco calls “voice opportunities”—in other words, small and medium size countries have to be 
heard in institutions whereas they do not necessarily have to be heard bilaterally.59  Just suppose 
that some countries take on specific functions—becoming good at them—and therefore 
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developing a niche that can be used as leverage.  Just suppose that power involves ideational 
aspects that promote prestige and allow the exercise of attraction in addition to coercion. 
There is no need to theorize about this.  As we saw above, states less-endowed in terms 
of material resources do receive tremendous benefits from multilateral institutions.  States 
provide unique niche functions in the international system.  And soft power matters.  Think of it 
this way:  Luxembourg gets to voice its opinion to the U.S. via N.A.T.O.—otherwise it would 
not have much say at all.  Pakistan gets to force concessions out of the U.S. and others because, 
in international relations, they have developed a niche for peace-keeping.  And soft power 
increases a non-military power’s prestige in international relations (as in the case of civilian 
powers Japan or Canada).60 
In such a re-conceptualization of world politics, states without overwhelming material 
capabilities can still exert influence and power by: (1) utilizing institutions to press particular 
agendas; (2) exploiting niches that in turn give them leverage; and (3) exercising soft power to 
bring other states into sharing their promoted objectives.  If the international system is re-
conceptualized in manner contrary to Structural Realism’s basic tenets, then this, in turn, raises 
questions regarding the Three Bs, which are strategies derived from Realism’s grim worldview 
that privileges relative material capabilities as the most important variable in understanding 
world politics. 
The problem with strategizing in world politics is that, for a long time, Realism’s Three 
Bs have been the focus of many statesmen, including in the current Bush administration.61  The 
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Realist view of the system and the strategic options available (Realism’s Three Bs) over-
emphasize hard power to the unfortunate discounting, if not outright exclusion, of soft power.62  
However, international relations in the present era are far more complex than Realism’s 
parsimonious hard power picture.  The good news, however, is that Realism’s challengers 
provide a more optimistic outlook, wherein states can still secure their interests, but do so in a 
manner that does not require distasteful strategic choices.  And one possible strategic endeavor 
that is encouraged by the above re-conceptualization of world politics, which is not necessarily 
consistent with Realism’s narrow hard power view, is a fourth B: brokering.63   
Realism’s Three Bs require a state to pick sides between two sides in a potential conflict, 
or in the alternative, to sit on the sidelines.  Such strategies are rooted in a pessimistic view of a 
conflictual international political system, where hard power is privileged.  The problem, though, 
is that more cooperation occurs in the system than does conflict.  And if states lock-in to one of 
the Three Bs, they run the realistic risk of missing important opportunities to advance their 
standing and to promote and protect their national interests in a cooperative and mutually 
benefiting manner.   
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One strategy which eschews Realism’s dark tunnel vision is the strategy of brokering.  
Brokering does not require states to take sides in disputes like balancing and bandwagoning do.  
Nor does it keep states from seriously interacting with other states as buckpassing does.  
Brokering instead calls for an active intervention that brings parties to a dispute closer together.  
It is based on the premise that, no matter which party is the most important or powerful outside 
the mediation room, inside the mediation room, the mediator is the most significant and powerful 
actor.  And just as mediators are highly valued in domestic society, so too can brokers be valued 
in international society.  What makes them valuable?  Is it their hard power?  No.  It is their role 
which involves practices, values, legitimacy, and credibility.  In other words, it is their soft 
power. 
But there is a tremendous difference between an individual mediator and a state broker.  
The former usually is called on for one dispute.  Once that dispute is settled, it is likely that the 
mediator will not interact with the parties again.  So the mediator only obtains benefits (if any) 
from his or her one-shot iteration.  A state that serves as an international broker in disputes 
between other states, however, is constantly going to be involved with those states in future 
interactions and relations.  This provides numerous opportunities to exploit situations to the 
relative advantage of the broker in such a benign way that is amiable to all the parties involved.  
After all, soft power is what brings status to the broker state.  And through this soft power, the 
broker state can get other states to agree to want what it wants.  For this, the broker state needs to 
attract other states to its agenda—and then get them to cooperate in the pursuit of such mutually 
agreeable norms and goals. 
Brokering, then, is premised on the view that all the parties to a dispute, including the 
broker, are significant actors, with the potential for short-term or long-term benefits depending 
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on the circumstances and any future controversies that might arise.  Thus, whereas Realist 
strategies are based on a zero-sum outlook where the goal is to take sides in an effort to receive 
hard power pay-offs in a conflict, brokering is a positive-sum strategy, encouraging cooperation 
through soft power, where everyone stands a chance of a positive pay-off in terms of both hard 
and soft power.  In the present post-Iraq War era, where the unipolar, U.S.-led Western bloc is 
showing signs of fissure, the time is ripe for the emergence of just such an intra-bloc broker. 
  
 
An Outline of a Soft Power Strategy for Greece 
Success in world politics is preconditioned on an understanding that power is both hard and soft.  
Hard power remains an important resource for commanding, coercing, and inducing other states 
into accepting your positions and demands.  But hard power often fails to generate outcomes that 
are commensurate with material resources, making its exercise costly and problematic.  Soft 
power is a critical means to getting other states to want what you want.  In an age when non-state 
actors are important players in the game of world politics and transnational issues are important 
to all tiers of the international agenda, soft power becomes a much more benign and effective 
means to an end.  On any given day in the international political system, the odds are that you 
will get more from attraction than coercion. 
Once upon a time, scholars and statesmen alike accepted, as gospel, Kenneth Waltz’s 
dictum that “the theory, like the story, of international politics is written in terms of the great 
powers of an era.”64  This is no longer the case.  Now, a non-state terrorist network like al-Qaeda 
is arguably just as important in international affairs as is India (which has the second largest 
population and nuclear weapons).  This is good news for countries less endowed in terms of  
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hard material resources.  Players are no longer measured strictly in terms of weapons, citizens, 
and dollars.  Values, practices, and roles are also vital to assessing an agent’s potential.  As such, 
states can pursue strategies other than just Realism’s Three Bs for engaging other state and non-
state actors, including major powers, and for increasing their relative standing in world politics. 
This brings us to Greece.  Greece is too poorly endowed in terms of resources and 
capabilities to significantly affect the distribution of material power by itself.  The bottom line is 
that, on its own, it cannot balance the dominant power forces today, which are U.S.-led 
coalitions.  Overt attempts right now would be futile, as they would incur American ire.  Greece 
can obviously join a European counter-weight—but this also involves two large risks.  First, any 
European counter-weight that can be mustered will be too weak to check a U.S.-led coalition.  
Second, the formation of a counter-weight runs the risk of alienating Greece from its other E.U. 
partners that side with the U.S.  Moreover, there is always the risk of abandonment.  Nor is 
bandwagoning necessarily the best bet.  Certainly, this carries a likelihood of rewarding Greece 
with increased influence and maybe even spoils.  Yet, it also runs the risk of alienating some of 
Greece’s anti-U.S. E.U. partners and undercutting a stronger European Union.  Buckpassing 
seems like a less risky strategy, but it also provide less payoffs.  If Greece does not actively 
participate in security deliberations, it might be seen as either indifferent or, worse, a free-rider. 
So, what else can Greece do?  In the past two years, Greece has lived through two unique 
experiences—guiding the E.U. through the Iraq War and staging the first post-September 11 
Olympics—which have put the country under the global spotlight, providing it with an 
opportunity to increase its international position and influence.   
First, Greece presided over the E.U. during the run-up to the Iraq War.  A tough job for 
any state, Greece managed to hold the E.U. states together as best as any E.U. President could 
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have during this time of diplomatic turbulence—and to do so in a way that did not alienate the 
U.S.  Here, then, is an interesting question: Is Greece part of Old Europe or New Europe?  There 
is no clear cut answer to this question.  And this works to Greece’s advantage!  The bridging of 
“Old” and “New” Europe explain why former Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis received 
phone calls from both French President Jacques Chirac and U.S. President George W. Bush 
praising Greece for its role in the diplomacy surrounding the onset of the Iraq War.65   
Greece can take its recent experiences and the reputation is has started to create for itself 
and build on them.  Greece received enormous praise for how it handled its E.U. Presidency 
during the Iraq Crisis.  It pursued a policy where, internationally, its stated goal was to promote a 
uniform E.U. position on the crisis.  While it failed, it was not for lack of trying.  This is why 
Greece received praise from both camps.  And this is why Greece is not easily pegged into the 
camp of either “Old” or “New” Europe.   
Greece was an active broker, encouraging consensus, during a difficult security and 
identity crisis within the Western bloc.  Some people might argue that Greece was only able to 
play this role because it held the E.U. Presidency.  But holding the E.U. Presidency does not 
make a government a successful broker.  Just look at what happened when Greece turned over 
the reigns of the E.U. to Italy.  Italy managed to offend a variety of the major players in 
international security affairs.66  If Greece was the broker, Italy was the badger. 
                                                 
65Louis Klarevas, “The Greek Bridge between Old and New Europe,” National Herald, 
February 15-16, 2003. 
66Stephen Castle, “Berlusconi Puts E.U. Presidency in Turmoil with Nazi Insult,” 
Independent, July 3, 2003, 1; and Stephen Castle, “Berlusconi Commits Europe’s Fastest 
Political Suicide,” Independent, July 3, 2003, 12. 
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Brokering is not a role easily filled by any Western state.  At present, it seems as if it 
cannot be undertaken by a large state.67  The E.U.’s big five took firm sides during the Iraq 
showdown.68  The five small states of the “gang of eight” also cannot easily fill this largely 
neutral role.  Nor are the two small anti-Iraq War Benelux states well positioned to take on this 
function.  And the ten member states that joined the E.U. in 2004 are too new to receive the full 
trust of all their more senior E.U. partners.  This leaves Greece as one of the few states that can 
emerge from the Iraq War showdown as being in a position to broker intra-Western disputes.69 
Second, while Greece’s E.U. Presidency during the Iraq crisis made Greece a point of 
focus, Greece’s successful staging of the first post-September 11 Olympic Games allows Greece 
to remain in a position of Western prominence—if it chooses to remain so.  Early assessments of 
the Games—“unforgettable dream Games,” in the words of the President of the International 
Olympic Committee—are certainly casting Greece in an unprecedented positive light.70  The 
                                                 
67If the challenge were to mediate only between large powers, than a large state could fill 
this role.  The case of Austria during the Concert of Europe is instructive on this point.  See 
Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 
1812-1822 (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1957).  But there are arguably too many middle- and 
small-power Western states that would consider a large-power broker as disadvantageous to their 
concerns and interests in today’s world. 
68Canada too is not likely an ideal candidate. 
69There are of course other potential neutral European brokers.  Norway has traditionally 
been a reliable and trusted broker of disputes.  Its recent cooperation with the U.S. over Iraq, 
nevertheless, has tarnished its neutral reputation.  Austria is another potential candidate to fill 
such a valued niche.  Given Austria’s recent excursion into extremist politics, culminating in the 
election of Jorg Haider, European elites might be hesitant, however, to empower Austria with 
such a niche—at least for the near future.  Finland, Iceland, or Ireland could also serve as 
possible brokers, although to date, each of these states has kept a relatively low profile in intra-
Western disputes and in international security affairs. 
70Quoted in Susan Sachs, “For Greece, Olympics Leave Pride, Relief and a Huge Bill,” 
New York Times, August 30, 2004, A1.  By most standards, the Athens Games were an 
overwhelming success.  For instance, the sale of over 3.5 million tickets surpassed ticket sales 
for both the Seoul and Barcelona Games.  Moreover, television ratings surpassed ratings for the 
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Olympics are also changing Greeks’ perceptions regarding their nation’s potential.  As one 
commentator observed, “This is a new mentality, a newly discovered self-confidence.  It is this 
momentum that Greece has won and which will carry it over many obstacles in the future.”71  
The current Prime Minister, Kostas Karamanlis, understands that Greece is in a unique position 
to increase its global presence: “Greece also had the golden opportunity to get the rest of the 
world to know her in her modern nature.”72  The next step is to maintain the momentum:  
 
We must prove that this great Greek summer was not a parenthesis.  We must prove that 
the success of such a great and complicated undertaking is not limited to two weeks of 
celebrations.  It is a watershed of the new era.  It is an investment in the new period that 
Greece is beginning.  It is capital for the years that are coming.73 
 
 
To reap benefits from such capital, Joseph Nye advises:  
 
The countries that are likely to be more attractive and gain soft power in the information 
age are those with multiple channels of communication that help to frame issues; whose 
dominant culture and ideas are closer to prevailing global norms (which now emphasize 
liberalism, pluralism, and autonomy); and whose credibility is enhanced by their 
domestic and international values and policies.74   
 
 
Being an open society strategically located to serve as a hub between Western and Eastern 
societies, a popular culture well admired, and a system of governance finally showing signs of 
political maturity, Greece is situated for a positive change in relative international standing.  As 
                                                                                                                                                             
highly applauded Sydney Games by over 15 percent.  Nikos Kostandaras, “The Games of 
Athens,” Kathimerini, online edition, August 30, 2004. 
71Kostandaras, “The Games of Athens.” 
72Quoted in Sachs, “For Greece, Olympics Leave Pride.”   
73Quoted in “Greece Looks Ahead,” Kathimerini, online edition, August 31, 2004. 
74Nye, Soft Power, 31-32. 
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Greece increases its soft power, it will simultaneously increase its status and prestige which, in 
turn, makes it a more attractive candidate to fill the role of broker.  And it is a positive cycle.  As 
long as Greece successfully brokers disputes, it will continue to increase its soft power.  So the 
critical question is: What general strategies can Greece begin to pursue in order to increase its 
soft power, while maintaining its impartiality within the West, thus allowing it to become the 
bloc’s broker?  While space constraints prohibit this study from offering a comprehensive and 
definitive answer to this question, a brief outline of a strategy can be proffered revolving around 
the three categories of soft power: normative, practical, and authoritative. 
Greece is arguably best suited for increasing normative soft power.  Greece is one of the 
birthplaces of Western civilization—the cradle of democracy.  The principles reflected in Greek 
history and culture are some of the most appealing values of the Western world.  But alluring 
Hellenic ideals extend much further than antiquity.  Greece, today, is an E.U. success story, 
overcoming its 20th century authoritarian tendencies to become a beacon of democratic values.  
One of its most successful normative endeavors has been to encourage an Olympic Truce—a 
cessation of hostilities and fighting during Olympiads, allowing citizens from all over the world 
to pause and appreciate international athletic competition in a manner that promotes respect, 
sportsmanship, and fairness.75  Even the lighter side of Greek culture, captured by its famous 
nightlife and slogans like “Ouzo Power,” promotes Greek soft power, for it speaks to a happy, 
open, and free society—a society experienced by many visitors, as Greece is the 15th most 
popular tourist destination in the world.76  In a way, Greek culture exudes the metrosexual 
                                                 
75George Papandreou, “An Olympic Truce,” Washington Post, September 9, 2000, A21.  
See, also, Nikos Konstandaras, “Life and Games,” Kathimerini, online edition, September 4, 
2004. 
76Mark Wilson and Richard Askwith, “Archimedes to Zorba with a Drop of Ouzo,” New 
Zealand Herald, August 13, 2004.  Greece currently welcomes between 13 and 15 million 
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image—“muscular but suave, confident yet image-conscious, assertive yet clearly in touch with 
their feminine sides”—that is now sweeping Europe, allowing “Brand Europe” to take over.77 
In terms of practical soft power, nevertheless, Greece has significant room for 
improvement.  On the international front, Greece pursued a decade of foreign policies in the 
1980s that alienated its allies more than supporting them.  In the 1990s, Greece tried to bridge 
those gaps, but its disputes with Turkey, its opposition to Balkans interventions, and its clash 
with Macedonia bred distrust of Greece within the Western alliance.  More recently, Greece has 
corrected its foreign policy shortcomings, becoming an advocate of Turkey’s membership into 
the European Union, a leader in the reconstruction of the once war-torn Balkans, and 
Macedonia’s leading trade partner.78  But perhaps its most conciliatory gesture came this past 
year when the government of Kostas Karamanlis went out on a political limb and cautiously 
endorsed the controversial Annan Plan for the settlement of the Cyprus problem.79  While the 
Plan was rejected by Greek Cypriots, the risky position taken by Greece sent a clear message to 
the international community that Greece wants a friendlier, more Kantian world in the Eastern 
Mediterranean—and that it is willing to be a leader in promoting such an enterprise.   
                                                                                                                                                             
tourists annually.  The Athens 2004 Olympic Games have, however, increased expectations for 
the near future.  A recent Alpha Bank study anticipates between 18 and 20 million visitors 
annually by the decade’s end.  “Benefits of Olympic Games Will Far Exceed Costs, Alpha Bank 
Study Says,” Kathimerini, online edition, September 3, 2004. 
77Khanna, “Metrosexual Superpower,” 66-67. 
78“Greek Premier Renews Support for Turkey's Bid to Join the E.U.,” Associated Press, 
September 10, 2004; and “Press Conference with the Prime Minister of Greece Konstandinos 
Karamanlis,” Washington D.C., Federal News Service, May 20, 2004. 
79“Greece Urges Greek Cypriots to Vote ‘Yes’ to U.N. Plan,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 
April 23, 2004. 
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While Greece has come a long way in its international affairs in just a short amount of 
time, on the domestic front, Greece still has great strides to make.  Its discrimination against 
Muslims, especially Turks and Albanians, have led various human rights groups to lamb-baste 
Greece as a hypocritical champion of Western norms.80  Along these lines, despite being bound 
to respect E.U. laws and regulations, Greece continues to face criticism for failing to comply 
adequately or quickly enough with all European Commission and European Court of Justice 
rulings, especially in areas of subsidies, taxation, and environmental protection.81  According to 
one newspaper report, Greece has the “worse record [of E.U. compliance] in proportion to [its] 
size and economic diversity.”82  The state also remains a bastion of nepotism and corruption, still 
filling its government bureaucracy with the age old practice of rousfeti.83   Although partly 
required by Olympic preparations, Greece moreover has raised economic concerns in Europe as 
a result of its spendthrift fiscal policies and policy procrastinations that increased public works 
costs.84  All of these practices continue to cast doubts on Greece’s willingness and ability to be a 
                                                 
80See, e.g., the 2004 Amnesty International Annual Report’s section on Greece, available 
at: http://web.amnesty.org/report2004/grc-summary-eng.  See, also, the plethora of material 
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full and collaborative partner in the European integration experiment.  On domestic policies, 
Greece must make greater efforts to comply with obligations and eschew political favoritism in 
an effort to earn the trust and respect of its European partners.   
With regard to authoritative soft power, medium- and small-sized states have fewer 
options available to them.  Greece, however, can pursue a three-prong strategy to increase its 
functions within the international community.  First, Greece can encourage more international 
collaborative projects and working groups.  In particular, Greece can continue to build on its 
efforts to promote economic and socio-cultural ties in the Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean, 
and the Black Sea region.  Being at the forefront of such endeavors also translates into a tacit 
conferral of authority to set and drive the agenda for regional politics.  Second, Greece can 
aggressively pursue seats and roles in inter-governmental organizations, especially in the three 
prominent organizations of which Greece is a member: the E.U., N.A.T.O., and the U.N.  More 
positions mean more control over particular issues affecting the international community, 
especially the Western bloc.  Third, as this study advocates, Greece can create unique niches 
within the international system, allowing it to drive policy outcomes in a manner respectful of its 
long-term national objectives.  Without question, becoming the West’s consensus broker will 
increase Greece’s soft power and preserve both Greek and Western interests. 
To this end, Greece should pursue a two-track course.  First, Greece should think 
globally, act regionally.  There are numerous problems affecting the region, and Greece can play 
a leadership role in addressing some of these.  For instance, Greece can continue to broker 
                                                                                                                                                             
Figures Up,” Kathimerini, online edition, September 22, 2004; “E.U. to Probe Accounts,” 
Kathimerini, online edition, September 24, 2004; “Greece in Bad Books,” Kathimerini, online 
edition, September 25, 2004.  One study, nevertheless, argues that long-term economic benefits 
are within Greece’s grasp as a result of the recent Olympic Games.  “Benefits of Olympic Games 
Will Far Exceed Costs, Alpha Bank Study Says,” Kathimerini, online edition, September 3, 
2004. 
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reconciliation in the Balkans, especially through cooperative economic and socio-cultural 
projects.  In particular, Greece can encourage European investment to alleviate some of the 
conditions affecting economically-lagging Albania and Kosovo.  Second, Greece must make its 
service available when intra-Western disputes arise.  Of course, this will require that Greece 
avoid taking sides in trans-Atlantic and intra-E.U. rifts, unless its vital national interests (i.e., 
Greco-Turkish issues) are at stake.  Until recently, criticizing its allies has been a practice that 
Greece was unable to resist.  But a successful broker must learn to rise above intra-alliance 
quarrels if it is to be entrusted with the task of building consensus.85  Taking such outgoing 
actions is a recipe for enhancing Greece’s prestige and position in the international community. 
 
Conclusion 
The U.S. is still the world’s most dominant power.  Moreover, the E.U. is not a counter-weight to 
American primacy, nor will it be in the near future given the divisions within it.  Instead, the 
E.U. remains part of the American-led unipolar Western camp.  What has started to change in 
recent years, though, is that the Western camp has begun showing signs of fissure.  This creates 
opportunities for confrontation and conflict among the Western allies.  Yet, it also creates 
opportunities for bringing the Western allies closer together.  As such, a niche can be developed 
that would help re-unite and strengthen Western camp.  The strategy for accomplishing this 
objective is not one of Realism’s Three Bs (balancing, bandwagoning, or buck-passing), but 
rather the strategy of brokering.  Given its recent historical experiences, Greece is in a 
historically unique position to fill this niche and pursue this strategy of brokering. 
                                                 
85As Newt Gingrich argues, in the present era, “The real key is not how many enemy do I 
kill.  The real key is how many allies do I grow.”  Quoted in Nye, Soft Power, ix. 
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States that serve unique but important functions need not be large countries, they need 
not have tremendous resources, and they need not have superior military capabilities.  They just 
need to provide their services well, with integrity, legitimacy, and credibility.  In doing so, they 
take on niche identities—identities that, in and of themselves, become a significant source of soft 
power. 
Greece presently finds itself in such an exceptional position amongst its Western allies.  
Greece was forced to deal with one of the largest rifts between European member states over a 
pressing global security issue.  Rather than side clearly with one camp or the other over the war 
in Iraq, Greece instead maintained a balanced stance, often utilizing its position as E.U. President 
to promote a policy of consensus.  This approach built on a consistent stance, in effect since 
1999, of actively promoting cooperation in often discordant international relationships: Turkish-
E.U. relations, Black Sea and Balkan regional politics, and the Arab-Israeli conflict.  As a result, 
Greece has begun developing an identity as a consensus-broker. 
Greece is also currently riding a wave of prestige related to its successful staging of the 
Olympic Games.  As one commentator observed, the Olympics presented “an unprecedented 
challenge, a unique opportunity to ‘upgrade’ [Greece’s] image and its influence on the 
international stage. And it achieved this.”86  The objective now is to sustain these pay-offs.  As 
John Ross notes, “It is too soon to know where these will take Greece, but they do provide a 
solid basis of better infrastructure, international good will and visibility that can be used, with 
enough vision, in some powerful and enduring ways.”87  So far, the indications are that Greece’s 
political leadership is aware of the prospects for international advancement.  As Prime Minister 
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Kostas Karamanlis recently stated, “we proved that we are ready to turn the page.  A new chapter 
has begun for our society.”88 
Should Greece continue along this path, at least within an intra-Western forum, it will 
increase its power and influence, for Greece will be in a position of serving a distinctive purpose 
amongst its allies: credible consensus-broker.  This is a remarkable shift in its external profile: 
from the awkward partner of the 1980s to the median position of broker.  Already, Greece is 
faced with unforeseen opportunities to make a name for itself in foreign affairs.89   
Establishing and maintaining such a niche will be a Herculean task, but it will also be a 
defining moment for Greece.  There is a window of opportunity that has not appeared before and 
could easily be lost.  Missing the chance could leave Greece as a follower from the fringe or, 
worse, incurring unacceptable costs from being forced to “play the game” confined to one of 
Realism’s Three Bs.  Seizing the occasion, however, will involve a sustained effort of producing 
cumulative gains.  The key question now is: Does Greece have the clarity of purpose and the 
degree of commitment to achieve these goals and secure its niche in the West?90   
As Greeks wrestle with this question, perhaps they would benefit from the wisdom of one 
of their ancient compatriots.  In his famous Funeral Oration, Pericles observed: 
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action, for example, is in crafting a united plan for ending the war in Iraq while winning the 
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Our form of government does not enter into rivalry with the institutions of others.  Our 
government does not copy our neighbors’, but is an example to them. . . .  Because of the 
greatness of our city the fruits of the whole earth flow in upon us; so that we enjoy the 
goods of other countries as freely as our own. . . .  Our city is thrown open to the world, 
though and we never expel a foreigner and prevent him from seeing or learning anything 
of which the secret if revealed to an enemy might profit him.  We rely not upon 
management or trickery, but upon our own hearts and hands. . . .  In doing good, again, 
we are unlike others; we make our friends by conferring, not by receiving favors. . . .  We 
alone do good to our neighbors . . . in the confidence of freedom and in a frank and 
fearless spirit. . . .  Any one can discourse to you for ever about the advantages of a brave 
defense, which you know already.  But instead of listening to him I would have you day 
by day fix your eyes upon the greatness of Athens, until you become filled with the love 
of her; and when you are impressed by the spectacle of her glory, reflect that this empire 
has been acquired by men who knew their duty and had the courage to do it. . . . 
 
 
This famous funeral oration is a reminder that the ancient Greeks were some of the first people to 
recognize that influence and prestige often emanates from soft power.  The goal for modern 
Greeks today is to draw on the wisdom of their Hellenic ancestors and the experiences of their 
Western brethren to expand their soft power, allowing them to bear the Olympic torch of 
prominence and power well into the 21st century. 
 
